What was frances role in the vietnam war

During World War Two, Japan also sought the resources the area had to offer. After Japanese defeat, many of the countries of Southeast Asia occupied by Japan protested their return to colonial status, resulting in a surge of nationalism.

American officials involved in the U. Like the other colonial powers, France attempted to reestablish its position in Indochina after , but found that it was difficult.

Laos gained its independence in , and Cambodia became independent in France promised Vietnam its autonomy by , but only offered limited independence, with France continuing to oversee defense and foreign policy. Bao Dai eventually abdicated a second time and lived out his life in exile in France. Although Ho Chi Minh would become famous for leading the North Vietnamese forces against the United States in the s, despite his communist leanings, he was not at the outset anti-American.

He had been disappointed by the lack of support given native peoples struggling for independence from colonial rule at the Versailles Conference that ended World War I. President Vincent Auriol of France and Emperor Bao Dai of Vietnam signed an agreement on March 8, , which provided for provided for the transfer of administrative powers to the Vietnamese government. The French government proclaimed the state of Vietnam within the French Union on July 5, , and Bao Dai was installed as prime minister.

Nguyen Phan Long formed a government as prime minister on January 21, The government of the Soviet Union provided diplomatic assistance diplomatic recognition to the Vietminh and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on January 30, The U. President Harry Truman of the U.

Vietminh rebels captured Dongkhe in September French government troops and Vietminh rebels clashed near Vinhyen in January , resulting in the deaths of some 6, Vietminh rebels. Finally, parallel to these developments, the Emperor Bao Dai, retaliating for Diem's vituperative political campaign against him, actively sought to supplant Diem. All the foregoing tension resolved to two central issues between the United States and France. The first was the question of how and by whom Vietnam's armed forces were to be trained.

The second, and more far-reaching, was whether Ngo Dinh Diem was to remain at the head of Vietnam's government, or whether he was to be replaced by another nationalist leader more sympathetic to Bao Dai and France. The first issue was resolved relatively quickly. General Collins struck an agreement with General Ely in Vietnam by which, despite serious misgivings in Paris, France agreed to turn over the training of the Vietnamese army to the U.

On February 12, , the U. But the political controversy over Diem was less easily resolved. Diem exacerbated matters with increasingly vehement stricture against the French and Bao Dai. The United States on its part was insensitive to the impact within France of Diem's militant anti-communism-frequently directed at the French Left-and of the rancor aroused by U. French advice to the U. Throughout the winter and spring, Secretary Dulles and the Department of State in general seemed disposed to consider favorably suggestions that an alternative leader for the Vietnamese be placed in power.

However, despite an ostensibly thorough search, no nationalist leader with qualities competitive with Diem's was identified. Both the U. The armed sects directly challenged Diem's authority, and he responded with force. An uneasy truce ended the first clash in March, and amid the mounting tension in April , the U.

On 28 April, Diem, against U. When Binh Xuyen resisted in Saigon, he committed the Vietnamese army to battle. Diem's forces won an immediate military victory, and simultaneously Diem's brother, Nhu, co-opted a committee of nationalist figures who called for Bao Dai's removal, and transfer of civil and military power to Diem. Encouraged by Diem's success, the U. In May , France, the U. France maintained that the U. France can no longer take risks with him. But, Dulles pointed out "Vietnam is not worth a quarrel with France," and offered U.

No decision was taken immediately, and during a recess Secretary Dulles received advice from the JCS that Diem seemed the most promising avenue to achievement of U. Secretary Dulles then proposed to the French that they continue to support Diem until a national assembly were elected. British support for Diem seems to have swayed Faure, and he accepted Dulles' proposal. The tri-partite meeting ended on a note of harmony, but the undertones were distinct: the days of joint U. Backed by the United States, Diem refused to open consultation with the North Vietnamese concerning general elections when the date for these fell due in July Pressing his military advantage against the sects, he moved to consolidate his position politically within South Vietnam.

In October, he won a resounding victory in a popular referendum in which voters were given a choice between Diem and Bao Dai. As Diem's political strength grew, his relations with Paris deteriorated. In December , Diem suddenly terminated the existing economic and financial agreements with France, and called upon France to denounce the Geneva agreements and break relations with Hanoi.

On January 2, , general elections in France produced a government under Socialist Guy Mollet, a third of the members of which were communists or avowed neutralists. A few days later, at a SEATO Council meeting in Karachi, Pineau proclaimed the end of the "era of aggression," and called for a "policy of coexistence.

Action followed Pineau's line. On the due date for the general elections agreed to at Geneva, France possessed no military forces in Vietnam. And the date for the fulfillment of the political portions of the Settlement, July , coincided with the inception of the Suez crisis.

Because the early phase of the Indochina war was an overt attempt by the French to reassert authority and control over their Indochinese colonies, the United States, although aware that European Recovery Program ERP funds were indirectly used to finance the war, refused to support that war directly. However, American actions taken to assure a neutral position-refusal to sell armaments to the French for use in Indochina; refusal to transport troops, arms, or ammunition "to or from Netherlands East Indies or French Indochina"--accompanied by public and private statements of anti-colonialist sentiments, did constitute, at least in French eyes, a policy hostile to the French interest in Indochina.

Therefore, early in , the Department of State attempted to reassure the French Government, and to make U. In spite any misunderstanding which might have arisen in minds French in regard to our position concerning Indochina they must appreciate that we have fully recognized France's sovereign position in that area and we do not wish to have it appear that we are in any way endeavoring undermine that position, and French should know it is our desire to be helpful and we stand ready assist any appropriate way we can to find solution for Indochinese problem.

At same time we cannot shut our eyes to fact that there are two sides this problem and that our reports indicate both a lack French understanding of other side more in Saigon than in Paris and continued existence dangerously outmoded colonial outlook and methods in area Neither direct nor indirect assistance to the French effort in Indochina was deemed "appropriate," however, until the French took concrete steps to grant autonomy to Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Despite U. In that period, the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek were driven from the China mainland, and in November, Mao's legions arrived at the Indochina border.

In January, , Ho Chi Minh declared that his was the "only legal government of the Vietnamese people" and indicated his willingness to cooperate with any nation willing to recognize it on the basis of "equality and mutual respect of national sovereignty and territory.

In France, there was a sharp debate in the National Assembly between Leftist advocates of an immediate truce with the Viet Minh, and Government supporters of ratification for the Elysee Agreement. Under the circumstances, the United States determined that this action met its minimum requirements for tangible French progress towards Vietnamese autonomy. Within three months the United States decided to extend economic and military aid to the new States. On 8 May , the Secretary of State announced that:.

The United States Government, convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development. Therefore, it is of particular importance to understand the reasons for the decision, the form of its execution, and its effects.

As the Secretary of State's statement above indicates, these were the days of the "monolithic Communist bloc," dominated by the Soviet Union. A National Security Council policy paper of stated that:. The USSR is now an Asiatic power of the first magnitude with expanding influence and interest extending throughout continental Asia and into the Pacific. Since the defeat of Japan. The question of how best to oppose the expansion of communism in Asia was raised to crisis proportions by the "loss" of China.

An extensive and acrimonious national debate on foreign policy was stirred, conducted in the midst of growing public apprehension over communist penetration, espionage, and subversion in Europe and within the United States. Many advocated increased aid to the Chinese Nationalists, who were regarded by many, even at this late date, as the bulwark containing communism in Asia. Although no major emphasis was given Indochina in , NSC papers did discuss the importance of the Franco-Viet Minh struggle, and link the future of Indochina with that of the rest of the world:.

In any event, colonial-nationalist conflict provides a fertile field for subversive communist activities, and it is now clear that Southeast Asia is the target of a coordinated offensive directed by the Kremlin.

In seeking to gain control of Southeast Asia, the Kremlin is motivated in part by a desire to acquire Southeast Asia's resources and communication lines, and to deny them to us.

But the political gains which would accrue to the USSR from communist capture of Southeast Asia are equally significant. The extension of communist authority in China represents a grievous political defeat for us: if Southeast Asia also is swept by communism we shall have suffered a major political rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and in a then critically exposed Australia.

It was precisely the extension of communist authority over China referred to above that led to increased emphasis in U. Theretofore, the U. This dilemma had been resolved by the victory of the Chinese Communists over the Nationalists, and by the threat posed to Indochina. The United States policy of support for the French and the Associated States was adjudged one befitting an anti-colonial democracy: support of nationalism and independence; opposition to attempted encroachments thereon by international communism.

The logic of this shift in U. The domino notion had been advanced by General Claire Chennault, among others, in the reference to Nationalist China; the domino theory as applied to Indochina reinforced the decision of where to draw the line of containment. Both ideas were embodied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense evaluating "the strategic importance, from the military point of view, of Southeast Asia":.

Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of containment of Communism stretching from Japan southward and around to the Indian Peninsula. The security of the three major non-Communist base areas in this quarter of the world-Japan, India, and Australia-depends in a large measure on the denial of Southeast Asia to the Communists.

If Southeast Asia is lost, these three base areas will tend to be isolated from one another; d. The fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the fall of the other mainland states of Southeast Asia. Soviet control of all the major components of Asia's war potential might become a decisive factor affecting the balance of power between the United States and the USSR. The feasibility of retention by the United States of its offshore island bases could thus be jeopardized.

This theory, whether more or less completely articulated, appears in the relevant NSC papers of the Indochina War period, and underlies all major U.

In the words of NSC 64 February, , "The presence of Chinese Communist troops along the border of Indochina makes it possible for arms, material and troops to move freely from Communist China to the northern Tonkin area now controlled by Ho Chi Minh. There is already evidence of movement of arms.

Official French sources report that Chinese Communist troops are already present in Tonkin in some strength. Direct intervention by Chinese Communist troops may occur at any time. It is almost certain to occur in strength whenever there is danger either that the Viet Minh will fail to attain its military objective of driving the French out of Indochina, or that the Bao Dai Government is succeeding in undermining the support of the Viet Minh.

Although the threat of intervention to be expected from Communist China did not again reach this intensity or certainty during the remainder of the war-the estimated probability of intervention declined consistently after the publication of NIE 5-estimates throughout the period indicate continuing Communist Chinese provision of military arms, materiel, and training to the Viet Minh, and the existence of Communist Chinese potential for direct intervention.

No direct reference was made to possible Viet Minh resentment toward, or resistance to, direct Chinese intervention. In sum, the U. It was believed that the Chinese were providing assistance to the Viet Minh throughout the period late On April 5, , the Joint Chiefs of Staff, referring to intelligence estimates, indicated to the Secretary of Defense their view that "the situation in Southeast Asia has deteriorated," and that, further, "without United States assistance, this deterioration will be accelerated.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff went on to state that: "In general, the basic conditions of political and economic stability in this area, as well as the military and internal security conditions, are unsatisfactory.

These factors are closely interrelated, and it is probable that, from the long-term point of view, political and economic stability is the controlling factor.

On the other hand, the military situation in some areas, particularly Indochina, is of pressing urgency.

NIE 5 was the over-all U. It estimated the French position as "critically endangered by the Viet Minh," and as "precarious. French resources badly strained; little or no real nationalist Vietnamese leadership, government; little popular support of Bao Dai regime; political and economic situation generally poor. French slowness and obstruction over the years in creating a Vietnamese national government and national army March 8, , agreements were not ratified by France until February 2, , and continued slowness in giving control of the bureaucracy to the Vietnamese, indicate a reluctant departure, if any departure, from colonial objectives.

Thus, the American perception of the situation in Vietnam in was generally one of gloom, with little light at the end of the tunnel; in retrospect. United States involvement in the bleak Indochinese situation was hastened when, on February 16, , the French requested U. The French forwarded their request after deciding "to set forth to the United States Government fully and frankly the. In any event the French Government was confronted with necessity of reducing the present French forces in Indochina by at least 25, not only for budgetary reasons, but because additional men were urgently needed in connection with French national military program.

Yet this appeal for aid, its thinly-veiled reinforcing arguments referring to withdrawal and the defense of Europe on the day following the severing of U. Issued on February 27 as NSC 64, the report concluded that:. It is important to United States security interests that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.

Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat. The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina were controlled by a Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard. Accordingly, the Departments of State and Defense should prepare as a matter of priority a program of all practicable measures designed to protect United States security interests in Indochina.

The Department of State believes that within the limitations imposed by existing commitments and strategic priorities, the resources of the United States should be deployed to reserve Indochina and Southeast Asia from further Communist encroachment.

The Viet Minh was strongly supported by the Chinese and the Russians because of the spread of Communism at that time. Iowa PBS is Iowa's statewide public broadcasting network. Iowa PBS provides quality, innovative media and services that educate, inform, enrich and inspire Iowans throughout the state. A noncommercial, public-service mission enables Iowa PBS to present an unequaled array of programs of lasting value to Iowans regardless of where they live or what they can afford.